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A conceptual partial equilibrium model of global
agricultural land-use
David K. Bryngelsson and Kristian Lindgren
We introduce a conceptual partial equilibrium model of global agricultural land use, based on
heterogenous land quality—an area that has received less theoretical attention than location
theory. The model is based on maximization of land rent at each parcel through choice of
crop and input intensity. Mechanisms of land rent and land-use competition are illustrated in
a transparent way, which can be used for e.g. policy testing and for improved understanding
of results from larger land-use models. A strength with this approach is that the model
to a large extent can be analytically explored. We show how different crops are optimally
distributed on land according to their respective area-dependent cost, i.e. costs paid per
area regardless of yield. Crops with high such costs are grown on more productive land and
crops with low such costs are grown on less productive land, in equilibrium. The equilibrium
solution of the model is unique. Further we show how prices are connected between crops
that compete for land.
Key words: agricultural land, bioenergy, food price, land rent, land use, land-use competition,
partial equilibrium model, price effects, Ricardian rent.
Land has a long history in economic theory,
starting in ancient times (Hubacek and van den
Bergh 2006) when agriculture and access to
land dominated the economy, and has through
time been treated by many of the most influ-
ential economists, such as Adam Smith, David
Ricardo (e.g. Buchanan 1929; Ricardo 1821;
Stigler 1952), Johann Heinrich von Thünen
(e.g. Beckmann 1972; Heijman and Schipper
2010) and Karl Marx (Haila 1990). These the-
ories have later been further developed in the
second half of the 20th century, see e.g. Hardie
and Parks (1997) Lichtenberg (1985), Licht-
enberg (1989), Palmquist (1989), Weinschenk,
Henrichsmeyer, and Aldinger (1968). See Haila
(1990) and Hubacek and van den Bergh (2006)
fore a more thorough description of how land
has been treated in economic theory over time.
Historically, discussions about how land rent
works have shown up in response to urgent so-
cial issues concerning land and land use (Haila
1990). Examples of such are Ricardo’s theory
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in response to a controversial corn duty in the
early 19th century, and a revived discussion in
the 1970s as a result of rapidly increasing land
and housing prices in the U.S. (Haila 1990).
The question of how land rent works is once
again hugely relevant, as energy security is-
sues in combination with climate change mit-
igation efforts, rapidly have increased the de-
mand for bioenergy. This rapid increase in de-
mand for bioenergy has put pressure on agricul-
tural markets and subsequently affected global
food prices via competition for land.
Focus of the research has—until recently—
been on building theory and explanatory mod-
els, that can be used to get analytical answers
or at least understandings of causal links. This
theory building has, however, mainly worked
with the location rent of von Thünen, whereas
the productivity rent of Ricardo has received
far less attention (Lichtenberg 1985). Location
rent was, of course, more important in a world
where transport was carried out with horse and
carriage and distances were not long enough
to allow for significantly different productivity
levels of land. This can be assumed to have
changed, however, with greatly improved in-
frastructure and cheaper transports, in com-
bination with trade on global markets where
goods produced on separate continents com-
pete. Differences in productivity of land are,
of course, huge on a global scale that cover all
different climatic zones.
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We have found two tracks in the literature
of the last decades that have dealt with pro-
ductivity rent of land. The first has been with
simple explanatory models, see e.g. Hardie and
Parks (1997), Lichtenberg (1985, 1989), James
(2010), and Swinton et al. (2011). These mod-
els are, however, very generalized and do not
explicitly try to explain the mechanisms in nei-
ther analytical nor quantitative manners.
The other track for treatment of productiv-
ity of land has been in larger and more de-
tailed models. Availability of ever more power-
ful computers and increasingly accessible data
from around the world, have helped push the
development of large quantitative models of
global land use and trade flows. These models
have been used for questions regarding land-
use changes and land-use competition in near-
future, as well ass long-term, settings (see e.g.
Gillingham, Smith, and Sands 2008; Havlík
et al. 2011; Johansson and Azar 2007; Melillo
et al. 2009; Schneider, McCarl, and Schmid
2007; Searchinger et al. 2008).
Such models are much richer in detail (e.g.
in terms of crop types, producer and consumer
regions, and user sectors), than the explana-
tory models above, and they give quantitative
results on rents and price effects. However, the
drawback of this approach is that greater detail
decreases the transparency of the models and
therefore makes it more difficult to understand
which mechanisms lead to which outcomes or
how robust the results are regarding parameter
values and assumptions made.
There has, however, not been much work
done in the intermediate between the two.
In this article we present a model framework
that builds on the work by Lichtenberg (1985,
1989) and Palmquist (1989), but with an ex-
plicit class of cost functions for agricultural
production. This allows us to derive analytic
results of the characteristics of the model be-
havior, such as the mechanisms for land rent,
crop distribution on land and price connections
between crops. This approach can fill an im-
portant gap in knowledge where studies based
on large models present results without any at-
tempts to explain how the results depend on
the underlying mechanisms.
The model developed in this article is used
as a basis for analysis of the equilibrium out-
come of several bioenergy scenarios in Bryn-
gelsson and Lindgren (2013) and as a foun-
dation for the development of an agent based
model (ABM) in which the system can be stud-
ied out of equilibrium (forthcoming).
A conceptual model for
agricultural land use
We construct a model in order to determine
the optimal distribution of different crops over
land of varying quality. For simplicity we as-
sume that different characteristics of the land
quality can be aggregated into a main aspect
determining the normalized productivity po-
tential on each parcel of land, ranging from 1
for the best land (realizing the full potential for
each crop) to 0 for the worst (no yields). If we
arrange all parcels of land in a declining order
with respect to this productivity, we get a de-
clining function Y (a) ∈ [1, 0], which states that
an area a of the best land has a productivity
of Y (a) or more. This is illustrated in figure 1.
Lichtenberg (1989) and Palmquist (1989) use
similar approaches.
We consider n different crops that can be
produced on the land. The yield1 yi for each
crop i on a land parcel at a is given by the pro-
ductivity of land times a crop specific yield pa-
rameter ηi, i.e., yi(a) = ηiY (a). All land owners
are assumed to maximize profits and decide to
produce the crop that gives the highest profit,
which also involves a decision on levels of in-
puts to use, i.e. cost, that should be put into
the production. Land owners can always be as-
sumed to decide what is produced on the land,
since they either rent out the land to the high-
est bidder, or “rent” the land to themselves by
choosing the crop with highest return (Hardie
and Parks 1997; Palmquist 1989).
We assume that there are two types of costs
involved (not including land rent, which is en-
dogenously determined in the model). The first,
αi, is a cost per unit area of land used (area
dependent cost), and this is constant for each
crop, regardless the land productivity where it
is grown. Area dependent costs are connected
to the area under production, such as tillage
and equipment capital. The second cost, βi, is a
cost per unit of produced crop i (harvest depen-
dent cost), and it is a variable that the farmer
can decide on as part of the profit maximiza-
tion. Harvest dependent costs are connected to
the quantities produced, such as pesticides, fer-
1 We assume that yield is measured in units of energy
per area, GJ/ha. The same unit is used for ηi while Y (a)
is dimensionless.
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Figure 1. Representation of global agricultural land with diminishing productivity.
The bars represent data for Suitability for rain-fed crops from plate 46 when forested
areas have been deducted (plate 55), developed by Fisher et al. (2002) and the curve
represents the continuous approximation (Y(a)) used in this model.
tilizer and transport. This means that the yield
directly depends on βi via the yield param-
eter ηi = ηi(βi). It is assumed that ηi(0) = 0,
η′i(βi)> 0, and η
′′
i (βi)< 0 and that ηi(βi) is
bounded.
Assuming a market price pi for each crop i,
the corresponding profits pii(βi, a) and produc-
tion intensities βi on a land parcel at a can be
written
(1) pii(βi, a) = (pi − βi)ηi(βi)Y (a)− αi .
The crop that yields the maximum profit at
each parcel of land defines the land rent r(a).
The land rent for a parcel of land at a, or the
maximum willingness to pay for the land, can
thus be expressed as
(2) r(a) =max
i, βi
pii(βi, a)
This maximization problem thus determines,
for each parcel of land, the decisions made by
the landowners on which crop i to grow and
with which intensity βi. The decision actually
taken by landowners at each parcel of land is
thus (i(a), β∗i (a)) = argmaxj, βj pij(a), and in
aggregate form this leads to the equilibrium
land rents in equation (2).
The produced quantity qi is given by the in-
tegral over all land parcels Γi for which pii is
the maximum profit, Γi = {a : r(a) = pii(βi, a)}.
The quantity qi can then be written
(3) qi =
∫
Γi
ηi(βi)Y (a) da .
The market price, pi =Di(qi), for each crop i
is endogenously determined by the aggregate
quantity supplied, qi, and an elastic inverse de-
mand function (Di) that is unbounded for small
quantities, i.e. pi→∞ as qi→ 0. It is assumed
that Di(qi) is decreasing with qi, i.e. D
′
i < 0.
The model can easily be extended to handle
exogenous prices or inverse demand functions
that are not unbounded at qi→ 0.
Equations (1)–(3) and the demand function
(Di) define the equilibrium problem that is the
basis for this article.
In the following, we argue for why there must
exist an equilibrium solution and we derive
some general properties of the solution.
Existence of land rent equilibrium
Since there is a limit on the total production
of crops, there is also, for the purpose of max-
imization, an upper limit of the total surplus,
i.e. the sum of combined consumer and pro-
ducer surplus. Thus, a maximum must exist
for the total surplus. At a maximum of total
surplus, one finds that the equilibrium crite-
ria, equations (1)–(2), for the land rent problem
must hold by the following arguments. First, at
a small parcel of land da at a where crop i is
grown, the farmer’s choice of βi must be the
one that maximizes profit. Otherwise a change
to the optimal value would directly lead to in-
creased producer surplus, as the profit would
3
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increase for the farmer at a. The resulting
change in total production of crop i would also
lead to a change in crop price, dpi, but to first
order in da that would only transfer surplus be-
tween producers and consumers without a net
change. Thus, a change from a suboptimal to
an optimal βi would lead to an increase in to-
tal surplus. Second, the same reasoning can be
done for the choice of crop i at a, leading to
the conclusion that to maximize surplus, the
profit maximizing crop is always chosen. Thus,
since there is a maximum in total surplus, there
must also exist an equivalent equilibrium for
the land rent problem. See Macmillan (1982),
O’Kelly (1988), O’Kelly and Bryan (1996) and
O’Sullivan and Ralston (1980) for a discussion
on the equivalence between the maximum sur-
plus problem and land rent equilibrium in the
case of von Thünen location rent.
Unbounded prices for the inverse demand
functions at qi→ 0 guarantees that all crops
are grown on some land in equilibrium.
The optimal intensity β
First we look at the choice of intensity βi. As-
sume that the system is in equilibrium, charac-
terized by crop prices p∗i . For each crop i that
the farmer considers, the maximum profit is
given by dpii/dβi = 0, see equation (1), which
results in
(4) β∗i = p
∗
i −
ηi(β
∗
i )
η′i(β
∗
i )
,
which is an equation that is independent of a.
It is straightforward to show that the solution
β∗i to this equation is unique. The optimum in-
tensity β∗i for each crop i is thus global and we
also have a global yield parameter η∗i .
The optimal distribution of crops
The question on how the crops are distributed
over land of different quality is resolved by the
following proposition.
Proposition 1. In equilibrium, if there is a
shift in crop produced at a certain parcel of land
a∗ (sweeping over a), then the crop i with the
higher area dependent cost αi >αj is produced
on the more productive land, so that crop i is
produced on a< a∗ while j is produced on a>
a∗.
See Appendix for proof of proposition 1.
The implication of proposition 1 is that each
crop i (with i= 1, 2, 3, ..., n) is produced in a
certain range of land productivity, i.e., crop i is
produced at land parcels a for which Y (ai−1)<
Y (a)<Y (ai). The land parcels at ai−1 and ai
thus correspond to land productivity levels at
which there is a shift in choice of produced crop.
It then follows that the crops are distributed
over the land variable a with the most pro-
ductive land being used for the the crop with
the highest area dependent cost α followed by
the next crop etc. Note that, at land parcels
ai, where there is a shift in optimal crop, the
profit for the two involved crops is identical,
which means that the curves for the willingness
to pay functions of a (equation 1) intersect at
these points. Land rents are thus continuous
across the intersections between crops. (Note
that, even in the case of general inverse demand
functions or exogenous prices, the proposition
holds, but the arrangement of the crops only
applies to the crops that are present in the equi-
librium solution.)
A straightforward argument for this arrange-
ment of the crops is that an agricultural system
with high area dependent costs (that have to
be payed per hectare regardless of yield) has
much to benefit from access to highly produc-
tive land. Such a system can support high land
rent payments in order to reduce the required
area. An agricultural system that pays little
in area dependent costs (e.g., cattle grazing)
has, however, smaller such benefits and tend
to prefer larger areas of lower productivity in
exchange for lower land rent payments.
There is a special case that can arise, namely
αi =αi+1. In this case, the land owners be-
come indifferent in the choice between these
two crops and they can be distributed in any
way on land of productivity between ai−1 and
ai+1. However, the total quantity of each of
these crops will be determined by there respec-
tive inverse demand functions.
Example with three generic crops
Here we construct an example with three
generic crops, numbered i= 1, 2, 3, ordered so
that α1 >α2 >α3, to show how the model can
be solved. Crop 1 supports the highest land
rent on the most productive land and is pro-
duced there, while crops 2 and 3 are consecu-
tively grown on land of decreasing productivity.
At certain values of a there is a shift from one
crop to the next, defined by equal values of the
4
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willingness to pay at these points. In addition,
if the productivity is too low, no crop is pro-
duced, and the land rent beyond that point is
zero. This can be summarized in the following
equations,
(5) r(a1) = pi1(β
∗
1 , a1) = pi2(β
∗
2 , a1)
(6) r(a2) = pi2(β
∗
2 , a2) = pi3(β
∗
3 , a2)
(7) r(a3) = pi3(β
∗
3 , a3) = 0 .
If these continuity conditions are not fulfilled,
there are parcels of land for which there is ar-
bitrage to be made, i.e. the land is not utilized
by the crop that can support the highest rent
and land owners would change crops until equi-
librium is reached and conditions (5)–(7) are
fulfilled.
These different functions for willingness to
pay at equilibrium are schematically depicted
in Figure 2.
Equations (5)–(7) in combination with equa-
tions (3) and the demand function(s) give the
solution to the model.
Price relations between crops
There are two potential connections between
prices for separate crops. The first is as substi-
tutes (or complements) on the market, where
the crops compete (help each other) for the
same market. Their prices are thus connected
via some cross-price elasticity. The second con-
nection goes via scarcity of production factors,
i.e. limited supply of land and/or labor or other
inputs.
In the example we show in this article, we
have selected three generic crops that are sup-
posed to not compete in any way on the market,
which means that the first connection is not
existing, or in other words, the cross-price elas-
ticity is zero. The second connection, however,
is not zero and depends on limitation of land
and the competition thereof. This connection
vía land-use competition is schematically de-
scribed in e.g. James (2010) and Swinton et al.
(2011). Here we continue on their description,
but make it analytically explicit.
An increase in demand (and therefore the
quantity supplied in equilibrium) for a crop
directly increases equilibrium prices for crops
grown on adjacent land. An increase in demand
of, for example, the second crop, leads to in-
creased ability to pay land rent at all levels of
a, i.e. pi2(a) increases. There would be a shift
upwards of the red curve in Figure 2. This holds
also for the land parcel at a1 and a2, and con-
tinuity of land rent then implies a higher land
rent also for crop 1 and crop 3. For crop 1, the
available responses to increased land-use com-
petition are to either decrease production (a1
moves left) and/or pay more land rent (pi1(a)
increases). The latter is accomplished by an in-
creased market price. The magnitudes of these
different effects depend on the demand func-
tion for crop 1. For crop 3 the response is a
combination of higher land rent and prices, as
well as a move towards land of lower produc-
tivity. The latter effect also implies more costly
production, with higher prices and lower quan-
tity at equilibrium. The price effect can trickle
down in a chain reaction in the case of more
crops.
From the willingness to pay for land equa-
tion (1) and the continuity conditions equa-
tions (5)–(7) it is straight forward to deduct
a price relationship between adjacent crops at
equilibrium, here exemplified by p1(p
∗
2),
(8) p1(p
∗
2) = (p
∗
2 − β
∗
2)
η∗2
η∗1
+ β∗1 +
α1 − α2
η∗1Y (a
∗
1)
.
The other relationships are analogous, of
course.
A key question here is to what extent
changed conditions for one crop affect prices for
other crops. This could e.g. be driven by an ex-
ogenous change in demand for one crop, such as
increased bioenergy demand. The dominating
factor influencing the crops’ price relationship
is the ratio η∗i /η
∗
j , but to find the exact effect
from an externally driven price change of one
crop, the new market clearing prices etc. need
to be calculated and to do this the inverse de-
mand functions need to be exactly known. The
effect is, however, bounded upwards by the ra-
tio η∗i /η
∗
j and bounded downwards by zero. The
upper limit applies for ε1 =0 and the second for
ε1 =∞.
These price responses apply at equilibrium,
i.e. when the market has settled and found the
new optimum.
Uniqueness of land rent equilibrium
Proposition 2. The land rent equilibrium
given by equations. (1)–(3), is unique.
For proof of proposition 2, see Appendix. How-
ever, the logic is that for a given set of market
prices, pi, there is a given set of optimal in-
put levels, β∗i , and corresponding willingness-
to-pay for land functions, pii(β
∗
i , a). In order
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Figure 2. Depiction of willingness to pay curves for three different crops. Blue curve
is crop 1, red curve crop 2 and yellow curve crop 3 from equations (5)–(7).
for another equilibrium to exist there must be
a combination with higher prices, with corre-
sponding higher input levels and willingness-
to-pay functions. For prices to be higher there
must be smaller quantities, qi supplied on the
market (due to demand elasticity). For quanti-
ties to be smaller there must be a shift towards
the left for each willingness-to-pay-equilibrium
point, ai, see figure 2 and equations (5)–(7).
Higher prices and thus higher willingness-to-
pay functions are incompatible with a shift to-
wards the left for the point, an where the last
crop n has a zero willingness to pay land rent,
pin(a) = 0. The argument is analogous in the
opposite direction. There can thus only be one
equilibrium.
Application of the model to
a bioenergy scenario
Here we illustrate the model with some plau-
sible parameter settings in two “scenarios”, one
with no bioenergy whatsoever and one with 100
EJ bioenergy, and compare the two to get some
indications of how equilibrium prices may be af-
fected by such an increased demand. The sup-
ply level of 100EJ is in the lower middle of the
range of global bioenergy potentials estimated
in the meta analysis by Berndes, Hoogwijk, and
van den Broek (2003), and in the recent report
by IPCC working group 3 (Chum et al. 2011).
Consider three generic crops: intensively pro-
duced edible-type and forage crops (IP), exten-
sively produced permanent pasture and forage
crops (EP), and bioenergy crops (BE).
Table 1 presents the parameter values we
used to illustrate how the model works.
Table 1. Parameter values for appli-
cation of the model.
η α β q0 p0 ε
IP 85 500 4 60 12 -0.5
EP 60 50 1 95 3.6 - 1
BE 200 300 3 100 - 0
Note 1: Units of parameters: η: [GJ ha-1 yr-1],
α: [US$ ha-1 yr-1], β: [US$ GJ-1], q0: [EJ yr-1],
p0: [US$ GJ-1]
Note 2: Values are based on data from Bern-
des, Hoogwijk, and van den Broek (2003),
Chum et al. (2011), FAOSTAT, Huang and Lin
(2000), Regmi et al. (2001, p. 21), Wirsenius
(2000, p. 108), Wirsenius, Hedenus, and Mohlin
(2010), and personal communication with Chris-
tel Cederberg.
Exactly what the land productivity function
Y (a) looks like in the real world is difficult to
know, but based on the data from IIASA pre-
sented in figure 1, the function Y (a) = 1− a/A
offers a relatively good fit, where A is the total
amount of productive land available, here set
at 4.4 Gha (forested areas are deducted).
Isoelastic inverse demand functions are as-
sumed for both the intensively produced crops
and extensively produced crops, but, of course,
with different elasticities. The bioenergy de-
mand is perfectly inelastic.
6
—Working Paper—
Results
In equilibrium the crops are placed in the or-
der (intensive crops, bioenergy, extensive graz-
ing) according to their area specific production
costs. In figure 3 the optimal land-rent curves
for the three crops are shown for the situa-
tion with and without bioenergy production,
respectively.
Adding a crop with a large demand (bioen-
ergy, BE) to the system significantly increases
land rents at all levels (see figure 3), from more
than 60 % increase in land rent for the most
productive land, to a multifold increase in rent
for land of lower productivity. The area used
for intensive production decreases somewhat
(and thus also the quantity by 6 %) in re-
sponse to the competition and its production
price increases by 13 %. Extensive production
is “forced” onto less productive land by the en-
ergy crops and thus the quantity produced de-
creases by 27 % at the same time as its price
increases by over 35 %. Total land area under
cultivation increases by over 10 % (from 3.2
Gha to 3.6 Gha), as can be seen in figure 3.
Discussion and conclusion
The main contribution with this article is the
presentation of a conceptual partial equilibrium
model for the global agricultural land-use sys-
tem, which is simple enough to be analytically
explored to a large extent, but detailed enough
to represent main mechanisms and to capture
several important features of the system. This
model works as a transparent tool to illustrate
important mechanisms of productivity based
land rent, land-use competition and crop distri-
bution over land (in optimum). It can also be
used to check how different policies (regarding
land, agriculture, food systems etc.) affect im-
portant system behaviors, such as food prices
and land rent. This is done by deriving explicit
land rent functions from yield functions applied
in a conceptual framework.
In this article we have shown that
(i) area-dependent costs determine the opti-
mal distribution of crops on land of differ-
ent productivity,
(ii) the land-rent equilibrium problem has a
unique solution that is identical to the
maximization of the combined consumer
and producer surplus,
(iii) analytical price connections between crops
from the competition for land are easily
derived.
Result (i) implies that production of each crop
gets located on land of similar productivity
(and not spread out), which is in line with the
results of Lichtenberg (1989). The crop with
the highest area-dependent cost is placed on
the most productive land and the other crops in
consecutive order with the crop with the lowest
such cost placed on the least productive land
that is brought under cultivation. This can be
understood as crops with high area-dependent
costs have more to gain from reducing their
area under cultivation, than crops with low
such costs. The latter “prefer” to expand pro-
duction on less productive land, as compared to
paying high rent for access to more productive
land.
Analytically deduced price connections be-
tween crops (result iii) show that changes in de-
mand for one crop affect prices for other crops
mainly in proportion to their respective yields,
but the connections also depend on various
other parameters. This result can have relevant
implications for cases when some crops act as
price takers in another system (e.g. bioenergy
in the energy system) and thus have exogenous
prices, while other crops compete for the same
land (in this case food crops and grazing).
The model developed in this article is applied
to several policy scenarios for large scale bioen-
ergy introduction in Bryngelsson and Lindgren
(2013), where the model is also characterized
in an extensive parameter analysis. The model
framework is also used as a basis for an agent
based model, in which the system can be stud-
ied out of equilibrium, in transitions between
equilibria and how equilibria form and land
rents are set (forthcoming).
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Appendix
Proof of proposition 1
Proof. In equilibrium, the profit in equa-
tion (1) for a crop i can be written
pii(a) =(p
∗
i − β
∗
i )η
∗
i (β
∗
i )Y (a)− αi(A.1)
=φiY (a)− αi
where we have introduced the crop-specific pa-
rameter φi = (p
∗
i − β
∗
i )η
∗
i . If there always is a
positive demand for a crop, regardless of its
price, all crops are grown and φi > 0. Each crop
is thus characterized by a profit function (or a
willingness to pay for land), and the crop that
gives the highest profit at each a will therefore
be grown there. How the crops are distributed
on the land is simply determined by their re-
spective profit functions.
For a pair of adjacent crops, say i and j,
let us assume that αi >αj . The profit func-
tions intersect at a certain a∗i , given by Y (a
∗
i ) =
(αi − αj)/(φi − φj) (implying that the crops
must have different φ-values). Since Y (a∗i )> 0,
we also know that φi − φj > 0. At the point a
∗
i
the profits are the same, but moving to less pro-
ductive land (higher a) leads to a decrease in
the profit that is different for the two crops,
d
da
(pii(a)− pij(a)) =(A.2)
= (φi − φj)
dY (a)
da
< 0 .
Since pii decreases faster than pij , crop i is
grown on the more productive land while crop
j is grown on the less productive land. The as-
sumption was that the area specific cost was
higher for crop i than for crop j, and the result
does not then explicitly depend on the market
prices for the crops. Instead a higher market
price for crop i is a result of the crops’ compe-
tition for land. 
Uniqueness of land rent equilibrium
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Proof. The land rent equilibrium given by
equations (1)–(3), is unique. This follows from
the following arguments. Assume that an equi-
librium is characterized by (a1, a2, ..., an), i.e.,
the land parcels at which there is a switch from
one crop i to the next crop i+ 1. From Propo-
sition 1, we know that crop 1 with the highest
α is produced on all land with quality higher
that Y (a1), followed by the other crops, so that
α1 >α2 > ... > αn.
If there is another equilibrium (a′1, a
′
2, ..., a
′
n),
we can assume that a′1 < a1. (If a
′
1 = a1, we
go on to the crop for which there is a differ-
ence, and start the reasoning at that point. If
a′1 > a1, we would instead consider the equilib-
rium given by a′1 as the starting point.) First,
we note that in a given interval [0, a], there is
only one equilibrium for crop 1 characterized
by equation (4), which we can re-write as
(A.3) β1 =D1(q1)−
η1(β1)
η′1(β1)
,
where we have replaced the price p1 with the in-
verse demand function D(q1) for the produced
quantity q1 of crop 1. Since all terms are contin-
uous functions of β1, and in the limit of β1→ 0,
the left-hand side is 0 and increases linearly
with β1, while the right-hand side is larger than
0 but decreases, as d/dβ1 applied to the right-
hand side is D′(q1)dq1/dβ1 − 1 + η1η
′′
1/(η
′
1)
2 <
0. This implies that there is a unique solution
to the equation. Thus there is not only a unique
equilibrium for β1 locally (for each farmer), as
is expressed by equation (4), but also for the
aggregate production in the entire interval for
crop 1, [0, a′1].
When we move from a1 to a
′
1 the equilibrium
characteristics for crop 1 changes as follows: By
applying d/da to equation (A.3), we see that
(A.4)
dβ1
da
(
2− η
η′′
(η′)2
)
=D′1(q1)η1Y (a1) .
With η′′ < 0 and D′1(q1)< 0, we conclude that
dβ1/da < 0. So, at the point a
′
1 < a1 we have
an equilibrium with higher intensity β′1 >β1.
With this also follows a higher price, p′1 > p1,
since p1 = β1 + η1/η
′
1 implies
(A.5)
dp1
dβ1
=2−
ηη′′
(η′)2
> 0 .
This also means that the produced quantity is
lower, q′1 < q1.
At the point a′1 between crop 1 and 2, the
profit for crop 1 has increased, since at equilib-
rium,
pi1 = (p1 − β1)η1Y (a
′
1)− α1 =(A.6)
=
η21
η′1
Y (a′1)− α1
and both η1 and 1/η
′
1 increases with price. We
also know that, if a′1 is a transition point be-
tween crop 1 and crop 2, the profit for both
crops are equal, which means that the price for
crop 2 must increase as well (since the profit
for crop 2 was lower than for crop 1 at that
point when the transition point was at a1). It
then follows that also for crop 2 the intensity
increases, β′2 >β2, and the produced quantity
decreases, q′2 < q2. With higher β and access to
higher quality land this means that the transi-
tion point between crop 2 and crop 3 also must
move to the left, a′2 < a2.
This scheme then repeats all the way to the
last crop n, for which we also conclude that
p′n > pn and q
′
n < qn. The last point an must
also move to the left, a′n < an, but in equilib-
rium the new point must be characterized by
zero profit. This is not possible since
(A.7) pin(a
′
n) =
η21
η′1
Y (a′n)− α1
and since the factor η21/η
′
1 increases with in-
tensity (and price) so that pi′n(a
′
n)>pin(a
′
n)>
0. Thus we conclude that the equilibrium is
unique. 
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